Abstract Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) is a modal logic that allows to reason about agents' abilities in game-like scenarios. Semantic variants of ATL are usually built upon different assumptions about the kind of game that is played, including capabilities of agents (perfect vs. imperfect information, perfect vs. imperfect memory, etc.). ATL has been studied extensively in previous years; however, most of the research focused on model checking. Studies of other decision problems (e.g., satisfiability) and formal meta-properties of the logic (like axiomatization or expressivity) have been relatively scarce, and mostly limited to the basic variant of ATL where agents possess perfect information and perfect memory. In particular, a comparison between different semantic variants of the logic is largely left untouched. In this paper, we show that different semantics of ability in ATL give rise to different validity sets. The issue is important for several reasons. First, many logicians identify a logic with its set of true sentences. As a consequence, we prove that different notions of ability induce different strategic logics. Secondly, we show that different concepts of ability induce different general properties of games. Thirdly, the study can be seen as the first systematic step towards satisfiability-checking algorithms for ATL with imperfect information. We introduce sophisticated unfoldings of models and prove invariance results that are an important technical contribution to formal analysis of strategic logics.
Introduction
Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) [7, 9] is a temporal logic that incorporates some basic game theoretic notions. In ATL we can for instance express that a group of agents is able to bring about ϕ, i.e., the agents in the group are able to enforce that property ϕ holds whatever the other agents might do. Semantic variants of ATL are usually derived from different assumptions about agents' capabilities. Can the agents "see" the current state of the system, or only a part of it? Can they memorize the whole history of observations in the game? Is it enough that they have a way of enforcing the required temporal property "objectively", or should they be able to come up with the right strategy on their own? Different answers to these questions induce different semantics of strategic ability, and they clearly give rise to different analyses of a given game model. However, it is not entirely clear to what extent they give rise to different logics. One natural question that arises in this respect is whether these semantic variants generate different sets of valid (and, dually, satisfiable) sentences. In this paper, we settle the issue and show that most "classical" semantic variants of ATL are indeed different, and we characterize the relationship between their sets of validities.
The question is important for several reasons. First, many logicians identify a logic with the set of sentences that are true in the logic; a semantics is just a possible way of defining the set, alternative to an axiomatic inference system. Thus, by comparing validity sets we compare the respective logics in the traditional sense. Secondly, validities of ATL capture general properties of games under consideration: if, e.g., two variants of ATL generate the same valid sentences then the underlying notions of ability induce the same kind of games. All the variants studied here are defined over the same class of models (imperfect information concurrent game structures) that generalizes extensive form games. The difference between games "induced" by different semantics lies in the available strategies and the winning conditions for them.
Thirdly, the satisfiability problem for ATL, though far less studied than model checking, is not necessarily less important. While model checking ATL can be seen as the logical analogue of game solving, satisfiability corresponds naturally to mechanism design. A systematic study on the abstract level is the first step towards algorithms that solve the problem.
Our results are relevant also outside the logical context. As already mentioned, by looking at validity sets we study general properties of strategic ability under various semantic assumptions. Ultimately, we show that what agents can achieve is more sensitive to the strategic model of an agent (and a precise notion of achievement) than it was generally realized. No less importantly, our study reveals that some natural properties-usually taken for granted when reasoning about temporal evolution of systems-may cease to be universally true if we change the strategic setting. Examples include fixpoint characterizations of temporal/strategic operators (that enable incremental synthesis and iterative execution of strategies) and the duality between necessary and obtainable outcomes in a game. The former kind of properties is especially important for practical purposes, since fixpoint equivalences provide the basis for most model checking and satisfiability checking algorithms. Finally, we introduce sophisticated unfoldings of models to show invariance results with respect to memoryless and perfect recall strategies. The unfoldings form an important technical contribution of this article. We believe that their impact goes beyond ATL, as they can probably be applied to other strategy logics. For example, it would be interesting to see which unfoldings preserve the truth values of formulae when imperfect information is combined with strategic commitment [66] , or when explicit quantification over strategies is allowed [20, 50, 51] .
The paper is structured as follows. We begin by presenting the relevant variants of ATL in Sects. 2 and 3. Then we define several unfoldings of ATL models, and show that they preserve truth of ATL formulae under appropriate assumptions in Sect. 4 . This is the most technical part of the paper, and readers interested only in the main conceptual contribution are advised to skip it and proceed to the next section. In Sect. 5, we show the formal relationships between validity sets for different variants of ATL. Summary of the main results and some conclusions are presented in Sect. 6 . About this article Preliminary versions of this paper appeared in [40, 41] . The journal version adds proofs, new results, examples, and more extensive discussions. This applies in particular to Sect. 4 where we stress the importance of tree-like unfoldings and provide a sophisticated construction as well as full proofs. We have also extended the results from [40, 41] (formulated mainly for the restricted language of ATL) to the more general language of ATL * .
Related work
ATL has been studied extensively in the last 15 years. The research can be roughly divided into the computational and conceptual strands. The former has been focused on the way in which ATL and its extensions can be used for verification of multi-agent systems, in particular what is the complexity of model checking, and how one can overcome the inherent difficulties. An interested reader is referred to [13] for an overview, and to [9, 17, 20, 24, 42, 48, 57, 59 ] for more specific results; some attempts at taming the complexity were proposed e.g. in [18, 23, 38, 46, 47] . Studies on other decision problems than model checking were much less frequent, though satisfiability of the basic variant of ATL has been investigated in [30, 31, 54, 64] .
The conceptual strand originally emerged in quest of the "right" semantics for strategies under uncertainty. ATL was combined with epistemic logic [1, 2, 39, [60] [61] [62] , and several semantic variants were defined that match various possible interpretations of ability [35, 39, 43, 45, 57] . Moreover, many conceptual extensions have been considered, e.g., with explicit reasoning about strategies, rationality assumptions and solution concepts [19, 20, 58, 63, 65] , agents with bounded resources [5, 6, 14, 15] , coalition formation and negotiation [12] , opponent modeling and action in stochastic environments [16, 37, 55, 56] and reasoning about irrevocable plans and interplay between strategies of different agents [3, 11] .
In the rich literature on the conceptual virtues of alternating-time temporal logic, formal analysis is relatively scarce. Axiomatization of the basic variant of ATL was proposed in [31] , and its expressivity was addressed in [9, 48] . Axiomatization of a particular variant of imperfect information was proposed in [32] . For comparative studies, invariance of the basic semantics with respect to a couple of classes of models was proven in [27] , and the correspondence between abstract and concrete models of strategic logics was the object of study in [29, 28, 52] . Surprisingly, relationships between the "classical" semantic variants of ATL (as defined e.g. in [57] ) have not yet been studied, though analogous results exist that compare more sophisticated variations to a more standard variant (cf. [36] for undominated play, [3] for irrevocable strategies, [4] for agents with bounded memory, and [18] for recomputable strategies under uncertainty). That means in particular that formal properties of strategic ability under imperfect information are largely left untouched. We are trying to fill in the gap, and start a more systematic charting of the landscape.
Reasoning about strategic abilities
Alternating-time temporal logic ATL [7, 9] is a temporal logic that incorporates some basic game-theoretical notions. Essentially, ATL generalizes the branching time logic CTL [21] by replacing path quantifiers E, A with strategic modalities A . Informally, A γ expresses that the group of agents A has a collective strategy to enforce temporal property γ . ATL formulae include temporal operators: " g " ("in the next state"), " " ("always from now on"), "♦" ("now or sometime in the future"), and U ("until"). Since ATL offers no way of representing agents' uncertainty in its models, and no operators to refer to agents' (lack of) knowledge in the object language, it allows to reason only about abilities of agents with perfect information about the current global state of the system.
Syntax of ATL
In the rest of the paper we assume that is a nonempty set of proposition symbols and Agt a nonempty and finite set of agents. Alternating-time temporal logic comes in several syntactic variants, of which ATL * is the broadest.
Definition 1 (Language of ATL*)
The language of ATL * is given by formulae ϕ generated by the grammar below, where A ⊆ Agt is a set of agents, and p ∈ is an atomic proposition:
The "sometime" and "always" operators can be defined as ♦γ ≡ U γ and γ ≡ ¬♦¬γ .
Formulae ϕ are called state formulae, and γ path formulae of ATL * . A path formula is simple if it consists of a temporal operator followed immediately by a state subformula and in the case of "until" the operator is also immediately preceded by a state subformula. In other words, temporal operators have to be applied to state subformulae.
The best known syntactic variant of alternating time temporal logic is ATL in which every occurrence of a strategic modality is immediately coupled with a temporal operator, i.e., we have coupled operators of the form A g , A , and A U . The language of ATL + sits between ATL * and ATL: it allows strategic modalities to be followed by a Boolean combination of simple temporal subformulae.
Formally, formulae of ATL are defined be the following grammar: 1
and ATL + formulae by:
Example 1
The ATL formula jamesbond, octopussy ♦kiss says that James Bond and Octopussy can eventually kiss, no matter how the other agents act. On the other hand, jamesbond, jaws ( ¬crash ∧ ♦land) (James Bond and Jaws can prevent the space ship from crashing and make it eventually land) is a formula of ATL + but not ATL. Finally, jamesbond ♦deadBlofeld ∧¬ jamesbond ♦ deadBlofeld is an ATL * formula (which clearly belongs to neither ATL nor ATL + ) which states that agent 007 can kill Ernst Stavro Blofeld infinitely many times, but he cannot kill Blofeld once and forever.
Basic models of ATL
In [9] , the semantics of alternating-time temporal logic is defined over a variant of transition systems where transitions are labeled with combinations of actions, one per agent. Thus, we assume that all the agents execute their actions synchronously; the combination of the actions, together with the current state, determines the next transition of the system.
In the rest of the paper, we will write
, and we will denote the set of collective choice of group A at state q by
We will sometimes use the term pointed CGS for a pair (M, q) of a concurrent game structure and a state in it. Definition 3 (Path) A path λ = q 0 q 1 q 2 . . . is an infinite sequence of states such that there is a transition between each q i , q i+1 . We use λ[i] to denote the ith position on path λ (starting from i = 0) and λ[i, ∞] to denote the subpath of λ starting from i. The set of paths starting in q is denoted by Λ M (q).
Example 2 (Robots and Carriage)
Consider the scenario depicted in Fig. 1 . Two robots push a carriage from opposite sides. As a result, the carriage can move clockwise or anticlockwise, or it can remain in the same place. We assume that each robot can either push (action push) or refrain from pushing (action wait). Moreover, they both use the same force when pushing. Thus, if the robots push simultaneously or wait simultaneously, the carriage does not move. When only one of the robots is pushing, the carriage moves accordingly.
To make our model of the domain discrete, we identify three different positions of the carriage, and associate them with states q 0 , q 1 , and q 2 . We label the states with propositions pos 0 , pos 1 , pos 2 , respectively, to allow for referring to the current position of the carriage in the object language.
Finite versus infinite CGS
In our definition of CGS (Def. 2.2) we have not put up any requirement of finiteness with respect to the set of states and actions. The only requirement is that the set of agents must be finite. In particular, we allow for infinitely many states in a model; we also allow for infinitely branching models. In this section we shall discuss this choice in more detail.
We begin by reviewing the literature and showing that both types of CGS-finite and infinite ones-have been considered by other authors. The semantics of ATL in concurrent game models was originally proposed for finite structures only [9] . 3 Many follow-up papers also adopted the assumption of finite models, for example [43, 57] that studied variants of ATL with imperfect information [11] , which extended ATL with persistent strategies, in [48] the expressive power of ATL is investigated, etc.
On the other hand, other authors did not restrict their analysis to the finite case, beginning with the work on coalition logic [52, 53] , through comparative studies of different semantics of ATL [26, 27] , the interplay between knowledge and strategies [2, 39] , strategic play in the presence of intentions and commitment [3, 44] , and so on. Also, different formalisms extending ATL * with explicit quantification over strategies follow different assumptions: on one hand, the strategy logic by Chatterjee et al. [20] assumes models to be finite; on the other, the strategy logic recently proposed by Mogavero et al. [51] only requires states and actions to be countable.
As we have already stated, we assume neither St nor Act to be finite (or even enumerable). How does that affect our work? First of all, for the new results in this article, it is especially important that some existing technical results can be applied to infinite models. This concerns in particular the axiomatization of ATL from [31] which was shown sound and complete for finite as well as infinite concurrent game models. To be more precise, the authors of [31] allow for infinitely many states, but assume that, at any state, there are only finally many outgoing transitions. However, their results extend to the case of infinite branching in a straightforward way. We use the axiomatization as a source of "standard" validities (like the fixpoint characterization for A ♦), and to show that the semantics of "perfect information memoryless ATL" and "perfect information perfect recall ATL" coincide also for infinite models (Proposition 1). Moreover, the notion of model equivalence for ATL (alternating bisimulation alias strategic bisimulation), while originally proposed for finite models only [10] , was extended to the unrestricted case and proved correct in [3] . We use and extend the concept to prove invariance results for tree-like unfoldings in Sect. 4 .
Secondly, all the results proposed in this paper are proved to hold if the semantics of ATL and ATL * does not restrict the class of models to finite ones. More precisely, it may be possible that one of our inclusion results between the validity sets of two logics, Val(L 1 ) ⊆ Val(L 2 ), requires the existence of an infinite model. This does not mean that the theorems that we present do not hold in the class of finite models. The latter issue, albeit interesting, is outside of the scope of the paper. Essentially, showing that our results hold in the finite semantics would require establishing finite model properties for the logics that we consider. To the best of our knowledge, such properties have only been proven for the "perfect information/perfect recall" variant of ATL [31] and ATL * [54] . Proving (or disproving) the finite model property for the other variants of ATL/ATL * is undoubtedly important, and we would like to study it further in the future. 4 In summary:
1. our inclusion results rely on the fact that we define the semantics of ATL and ATL * in both finite and infinite models; and 2. whenever a finite model property holds for two logics under consideration, our results comparing the two logics apply also when the semantics is restricted to finite models.
Strategies and abilities in basic semantics of ATL
ATL modalities refer to the outcome of strategic play for a given coalition. Following the tradition of extensive form games in game theory, a strategy of agent a is understood as a plan that specifies what a is going to do in each situation. In the standard version of ATL [7, 9] , strategies are represented by functions s a : St + → Act. Thus, it is implicitly assumed that agents have perfect information (at each moment, they can precisely recognize the current global state of the system) and perfect recall (they can base their choices on the whole history of the game so far, not just the last state). Alternatively, one can assume that agents have no memory beyond what is already contained in the current state, which gives rise to the notion of memoryless (or positional) strategy. As we explain more systematically in Sect. 3, we will use the notation from [57] where i (resp. I) stands for imperfect (resp. perfect) information, and r (resp. R) for imperfect (resp. perfect) recall. 
Definition 4 (IR-and
Often, we will omit the subscript "M" if it is clear from the context.
Let M be a CGS, q a state, and λ a path in M. Now, the semantics of ATL * and its sublanguages can be defined by the following clauses [9] : Note that the semantics does not address the issue of coordination between members of the coalition [25, 34] : if there exist several successful joint strategies for A, the agents in A are assumed to somehow choose between them.
Finally, validity and satisfiability in ATL are defined in the standard way.
Definition 6 (Validity and satisfiability)
Formula ϕ is valid in model M iff it holds in every state of M, i.e., M, q | ϕ for every q ∈ St M . The formula is valid in a class of models C iff it is valid in every model from C. Dually, ϕ is satisfiable in a class of models C iff there exists M ∈ C and a state q in M such that M, q | ϕ.
Some important validites
We recall that the following fixpoint properties are valid in the basic semantics of ATL presented in Sect. 2.4:
Validity of these formulae was demonstrated in [9] for finite models, and in [31] for finitely branching models (with possibly infinitely many states). It is easy to check that the argument extends to models with infinite branching.
The intuitive meaning of the fixpoint equivalences is that planning for a long-term goal (like achieving ϕ eventually, or maintaining ϕ persistently) can be decomposed into finding a good opening move and a suitable follow-up. Such properties are crucial for building model checking and satisfiability checking algorithms, and in particular they allow for incremental iterative synthesis of strategies.
Moreover, the path quantifiers A, E of CTL can be expressed in the standard semantics of ATL with ∅ , Agt respectively. Again, checking this is routine, even for models with infinitely many states and infinite branching. As a consequence, the CTL duality axioms can be rewritten in ATL, and become validities in the basic semantics:
We observe that all the properties presented in this subsection are schemes, rather than single formulae, and allow for uniform substitution. More precisely, ϕ can be replaced by any state formula of ATL, and the resulting formula is a validity of ATL. Moreover, ϕ in the duality axioms can be replaced by any state or path formula of ATL * , and the resulting formula is a validity of ATL * .
Semantic variants: uncertainty and recall
As we already pointed out in Sect. 2.4, one can distinguish between two types of strategies: an agent may base its decision on the current state or on the whole history of states that have occurred. Also, the agent may have complete or incomplete knowledge about the current global state of the system throughout the game. A number of semantic variations have been proposed for ATL, e.g. [3, 4, 35, 39, 43, 45, 57] . In this paper, we study the "canonical" variants as proposed in [57] . There, a natural taxonomy of four strategy types was introduced and labeled as follows: R (resp. r) stands for perfect (resp. imperfect) recall, and I (resp. i) refers to perfect (resp. imperfect) information. The semantics of ATL, ATL + and ATL * can be parameterized with the strategy type-yielding four different semantic variants of the logic, labeled accordingly (ATL IR , ATL Ir , ATL iR , ATL ir , etc.).
In this paper, we extend the taxonomy with a distinction between objective and subjective abilities under imperfect information, denoted by i o and i s , respectively; the distinction can be traced back to [35, 39, 43, 45] . Intuitively, subjective ability to bring about γ means that the agents are able to both identify and execute the right strategy, i.e., they not only can play to achieve γ ; they also know how to do it. Objective ability is a weaker property: the agents could execute the right strategy, but they do not necessarily know which one works out, and they might be even unaware that such a strategy exists. Examples of agents who have objective but not subjective ability to achieve their goals include: garbage collecting robots that execute a strategy (program) provided by the producer, a Master's student executing a strategy hinted by his/her supervisor, etc.
The distinction between perfect and imperfect recall (R vs. r) is reflected in the type of function used to represent strategies (St + → Act vs. St → Act). The distinction between perfect and imperfect information (I vs. i) yields constraints on the set of functions that represent "feasible" strategies. The additional refinement of the imperfect information case (i o vs. i s ) determines which outcome paths will be taken into account when evaluating the success of a strategy.
Imperfect information models and strategies
Models, imperfect information concurrent game structures (iCGS) [57, 61] 
as the set of all histories in M starting from q, i.e., all the finite prefixes of paths in
Additionally, for any equivalence relation R over a set X we use [x] R to denote the equivalence class of x. Moreover, we use the abbreviations ∼ A := a∈A ∼ a and ≈ A := a∈A ≈ a . We also write ∼ M A and ≈ M A if the model is not clear from the context. Note that relations ∼ A and ≈ A implement the "everybody knows" type of collective knowledge (i.e., q and q are indistinguishable for group A iff there is at least one agent in A for whom q and q look the same).
Definition 9 (ir-, iR-strategies)
An imperfect information memoryless strategy (ir-strategy in short) is an Ir-strategy satisfying the following additional constraint: if q ∼ a q then s a (q) = s a (q ).
An imperfect information perfect recall strategy (iR-strategy in short) of agent a is an
That is, strategy s a is a conditional plan that specifies a's action in each state of the system (for memoryless agents) or for every possible history of the system evolution (for agents with perfect recall). Moreover, imperfect information strategies specify the same choices for indistinguishable states (resp. histories).
Example 4 (Robots and Carriage, ctd.)
We refine the scenario from Example 2 by restricting perception of the robots. Namely, we assume that robot 1 is only able to observe the color of the surface on which it is standing, and robot 2 perceives only the texture (cf. Fig. 2a) . As a consequence, the first robot can distinguish between position 0 and position 1, but positions 0 and 2 look the same to it. Likewise, the second robot can distinguish between positions 0 and 2, but not 0 and 1 (cf. Fig. 2b ).
Note that the strategy from Example 3 cannot be used anymore because it is not uniform (indeed, the strategy tells robot 1 to wait in q 0 and push in q 2 but both states look the same to the robot). 
Subjective epistemic outcome
Assumptions about agents' (un)certainty (i.e. the distinction between I and i) and recall (i.e. the distinction between R and r ) are encoded in the mathematical structures that are used to represent strategies. However, if agent a is to make sure that a strategy s a enforces property γ , it is not sufficient to consider only the paths from out (q, s a ) because a does not necessarily know that q is the current state. To know that s a guarantees γ , agent a should also check the outcome paths starting from states indistinguishable from q. From a conceptual point of view it makes sense to define two types of ability under imperfect information. Objective ability (i o ) means that a has an executable winning strategy, but the agent may be unaware of that, or be unable to identify the strategy on her own. Subjective ability (i s ) requires that a has a winning strategy and that a can identify such a strategy, i.e., the agents knows how to play and not only that a good way of playing exists. On the semantic side, this is reflected by the set of paths that are taken into account. Objective ability refers to the outcome paths that can objectively happen, while subjective ability builds on the outcome paths that are subjectively possible according to a's available information. 6 Definition 10 (Subjective epistemic outcome, x-outcome) Let M be an iCGS, q a state in it and s A a collective strategy for group
else.
Again, we omit M if it is clear from context.
Example 5 (Robots and Carriage)
In the scenario from Example 4, a possible uniform strategy of robot 1 is to push in q 0 and q 2 , and wait in q 1 . If the starting state is q 0 then the strategy objectively makes sure that the system will never move to q 2 . However, robot 1 does not know that the strategy is successful in avoiding q 2 since he must take into account also the outcome paths starting from q 2 which trivially violate the path property ¬pos 2 . Thus, 1 has the objective, but not the subjective, ability to enforce ¬pos 2 in state q 0 .
In order to ensure a uniform notation, we introduce x y-strategies for x ∈ {i s , i o , I } and y ∈ {r, R} as follows: 
As before, collective xy-strategies s A are tuples of individual xy-strategies s a , one per a ∈ A. We emphasize that i s y-and i o y-strategies are defined in the very same way, only the notion of outcome is different. Note also that the constraints in collective strategies refer to individual choices and individual relations ∼ a (resp. ≈ a ), and not to collective choices and the derived relations ∼ A (resp. ≈ A ).
Unified setting: x y-semantics of ATL
Finally, we put the pieces together and define the semantics of ATL xy , ATL + xy , and ATL * xy for x ∈ {i s , i o , I } and y ∈ {r, R} by changing the clause for A γ from Sect. 2.4 in the following way:
M, q | xy A γ iff there is an xy-strategy s A for agents A such that for each path
Note, again, that the I and i o semantics look only at outcome paths starting from the current global state of the system. In contrast, the i s semantics of A γ refers to all outcome paths starting from states that look the same as the current state for coalition A. Hence, it formalizes the notion of A knowing how to play in the sense that A can identify a single strategy that succeeds from all the states they consider possible. We follow [57] by taking the "everybody knows" interpretation of collective uncertainty. More general settings were proposed in [39, 43] . We believe that the results in this paper carry over to the other cases of "knowing how to play", too.
Example 6 (Robots and Carriage, ctd.) Consider the modified robots scenario from Example 4 ( Fig. 2) . With observational capabilities of the robots restricted in this way, no agent knows how to make the carriage reach or avoid any selected state singlehandedly from q 0 , i.e., M 0 , q 0 | isy ¬ i ♦pos j and M 0 , q 0 | isy ¬ i ¬pos j for all y ∈ {r, R}, i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Note in particular that the strategy from Example 3 cannot be used here because it is not uniform, and the strategy from Example 5 does not succeed because of outcome paths from indistinguishable states. Still, the latter strategy can be used to demonstrate that robot 1 has the objective ability to avoid q 2 (though not q 1 anymore):
The robots can keep the carriage away from pos 1 together, but only in the objective sense: M 0 , q 0 | ioy 1, 2 ¬pos 1 . However, they cannot identify a strategy which guarantees that: M 0 , q 0 | isy ¬ 1, 2 ¬pos 1 (when in q 0 , robot 2 considers it possible that the system is already in the "bad" state q 1 ). So, do the robots know how to play to achieve anything? Yes, for example they know how to make the carriage reach a given state eventually: M 0 , q 0 | isy 1, 2 ♦pos 1 etc.-it suffices that one of the robots pushes all the time and the other waits all the time.
For the above properties the type of robots' recall does not matter (they hold in both memoryless and perfect recall strategies). 1, 2 ♦ pos 1 is an example formula that distinguishes between the two sets of strategies. Note that M 0 , q 0 | ior ¬ 1, 2 ♦ pos 1 : the robots have no memoryless strategy to bring the carriage to pos 1 and keep it there forever, even in the objective sense. Still, they have a successful perfect recall strategy for that, and are able to identify it: M 0 , q 0 | isR 1, 2 ♦ pos 1 . The right strategy is that one robot pushes and the other waits for the first 3 steps. After that, they know their current position exactly, and can go straight to position 1 and stay there.
Folk result: memory does not matter for perfect information
We observe that the basic semantics of ATL * from [9] corresponds exactly to ATL * IR . A folk result states that, in the restricted language of ATL both semantics for perfect information coincide. That is, exactly the same formulae characterize models and their states in ATL IR and ATL Ir .
Proposition 1 For every iCGS M, state q, and ATL formula ϕ, we have that
Proof For finite models, equivalence of the semantics has been observed in [57] , and follows from correctness of the model checking algorithm presented in [9] . It is not entirely obvious, however, that the result should extend to the infinite case. We present our own proof sketch below.
First, we observe that ATL IR and ATL Ir have the same validities. This follows from the results in [3] showing that: (1) perfect recall strategies in a CGS correspond to memoryless strategies in its tree unfolding, (2) every pointed CGS is strategically bisimilar to its tree unfolding, and (3) the same formulae of ATL Ir hold in strategically bisimilar models (cf. also a more detailed exposition in Sect. 4.1).
Now we can prove the equivalence of M, q | IR ϕ and M, q | Ir ϕ by induction over the structure of ϕ.
we take the axiom schemes (FP ) and (GFP ) from [31] . It was proved in [31] that all their instances are validities of ATL IR . 7 By the previous observation, all the instances of schemes (FP ) and (GFP ) are validities of ATL Ir too. But that means that A is the greatest fixpoint of the same monotone transformer of state sets in both semantics | IR and | Ir . Thus, the set of states satisfying A ψ in M is the same in both semantics.
The proof for A ψ 1 U ψ 2 is analogous, by showing that its extension in | IR and | Ir is the least fixpoint of the same monotone transformer of state subsets from M.
Note that the IR and Ir semantics coincide only for the restricted syntactic variant ATL. For ATL * , and even ATL + , there are formulae that distinguish the two semantics, as we demonstrate in Sect. 5.1.
Perfect recall and tree-like unfoldings
Now we can turn to the original contribution of this paper. We begin by preparing the formal ground for our comparison of ATL validities under different semantics. In this section, we define several tree-like unfoldings of models, and show that they preserve truth of ATL formulae provided appropriate assumptions about agents' uncertainty and notion of success. This is the most technical part of the paper, needed mostly to prove the inclusion results in Sect. 5.1. However, its importance goes beyond technicalities. The unfoldings uncover some of the conceptual structure that underlies ATL. In particular, they expose a "forgetting" phenomenon in the semantics of ATL: even agents with perfect recall are assumed to forget their past observations when proceeding to a subtask specified by a nested subformula (like in a ♦ a p). In a way, one can talk about two variants of perfect recall: the "almost perfect recall" where agents use perfect recall strategies but abandon their previous observations when trying to enforce a nested strategic formula, and "truly perfect recall" where their hitherto observations carry over to the nested strategic task. On the other hand, our invariance theorems show that alternating-time temporal logic (even in its broadest syntactic variant ATL * ) is too poor to distinguish between the two kinds of recall.
We believe that this section is of interest to readers who are intrigued by intricacies of game logics or search for tools that can be used to prove similar invariance results. On the other hand, readers interested only in the main conceptual contribution of this paper (i.e., the comparison of validities for variants of ATL) are advised to skip this part and proceed to Sect. 5. Plan of Sect. 4 A tree-like unfolding of an iCGS is an (infinite) model in which nodes correspond to finite sequences of states (i.e., histories) in the original iCGS. It is easy to see that the underlying transition structure of such an unfolding is a tree or a forest. The advantage of these structures is that perfect recall strategies and memoryless strategies coincide in treelike unfoldings. Moreover, each perfect recall strategy in the original model corresponds to a memoryless strategy in the unfolding yielding an equivalent outcome, and vice versa. Both properties are rather standard in the perfect information setting. For imperfect information, however, the constructions are more involved due to the specialities of the iR-semantics; more precisely, the knowledge of agents is "reset" whenever a nested strategic modality is evaluated.
For each of the three semantic settings of:
-perfect information, -imperfect information with the objective semantics, -imperfect information with the subjective semantics,
we proceed as follows:
1. We characterise appropriate tree-like structures and show that memoryless and perfect recall strategies coincide on them. 2. We define appropriate unfoldings and show that they result in tree-like structures. 3. We show that the unfoldings are truth-preserving (i.e. a formula which is true in the original model is also true in the tree-like unfolding and vice versa).
Perfect information
We begin with tree unfoldings of perfect information CGS's. We draw inspiration from the proof of [3, Theorem 8.3] . 
Moreover, we use ρ M (q) as a shortcut for ρ M (q 0 , q) (we will omit the subscript if clear from context). We note that ρ M (q 0 ) = q 0 .
Every state q in a tree-like CGS uniquely determines the path that leads from the root to q. Hence, perfect recall is already included in the states of the model. This is formally shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Recall invariance for tree-like CGS)
For every tree-like CGS M, state q in M, and ATL * -formula ϕ, we have:
Proof The proof is done by induction over the structure of ϕ. Base cases:
Propositional case: Straightforward. Case: ϕ ≡ A γ where γ contains no nested strategic modalities. The left-to-right direction is obvious. Now suppose that M, q | IR A γ and let s A be a collective IR-
Induction step:
We observe that each state q at which a state subformula ψ of γ is evaluated forms the root of a tree-like CGS. Then, by induction, ψ has the same truth value in q according to the IR-and Ir-semantics and can be replaced by a new atomic proposition with the appropriate valuation. This yields formula ϕ ≡ A γ with no nested strategic modalities, to which we apply the same argument as above.
A natural question is whether every model has an equivalent tree-like CGS. By "equivalent" we mean that the sets of formulae which hold at corresponding states are always the same.
Definition 12 (Tree unfolding) Let
M = (Agt, St, , π, Act, d, o) be a CGS and q be a state in it. The (perfect information) tree unfolding of the pointed model (M, q) denoted T (M, q) is defined as (Agt, St , , π , Act, d , o ) where -St := Λ f in M (q), -d (a, h) := d(a, last (h)), -o (h, α) := h • o(last (h), α), and -π (h) := π(last (h)).
The node q in the unfolding is called the root of T (M, q).
An example tree unfolding is shown in Fig. 3 . It is important to note that histories in M are states in T (M, q) and that each tree unfolding is tree-like:
Proposition 3 The tree unfolding of a pointed CGS (M, q) is tree-like.
We now show that satisfaction of ATL * -formulae is invariant under tree unfoldings and that memory is not needed in the tree unfolding. 
Proof The second equivalence follows from Propositions 2 and 3. To prove the first equivalence we show that, for all 
Since the valuation of propositions only depends on the final state of a history and since Irstrategies can be seen as special cases of IR-strategies, we have also that
Then, by Propositions 2 and 3, there is an Irstrategy s A such that for all λ ∈ out (h, s A ) we have that T (M, q), λ | γ . We define the following IR-strategy t A : 
and thus M, last (h) | IR ϕ.
Induction step:
Case: ϕ ≡ ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 . Straightforward. Case: ϕ ≡ ¬ψ. Straightforward. Case: ϕ ≡ A γ . We observe that for each state q in M reachable from q at which a state-subformula ϕ of γ is evaluated there is a history h such that T (M, q) contains a state hq at which the very subformula holds (by induction hypothesis). Then we apply the same reasoning as for the case with no nested strategic modalities.
Imperfect information: objective ability
Unlike in the perfect information case, tree unfoldings for imperfect information must also take into account the indistinguishability relations. We construct our argument for the i o case similarly to Sect. 
In other words, in an i o R-tree-like structure the information sets in a game can only be more precise when the game already follows some previous interaction. The next proposition is analogous to Proposition 2. 
Case: ϕ ≡ A γ . We observe that each state q at which a state subformula ψ of γ is evaluated forms the root of a i o R-tree-like iCGS. Then, by induction, ψ has the same truth value in q according to the i o R-and i o r-semantics and can be replaced by a new atomic proposition with the appropriate valuation. This yields formula ϕ ≡ A γ with no nested strategic modalities, to which we apply the same argument as above. Now, the i o R-tree unfolding is defined as standard tree unfolding for the perfect information case extended with indistinguishability relations between histories of the model (which are nodes of the unfolding). 
a h where h and h start in q.
As an example, the i o R-tree unfolding of the robots and carriage iCGS is presented in Fig. 4 . Proof Clearly, the unfolding has tree structure and is i o R-tree-like by definition of the indistinguishability relations in the i o R-tree-unfolding.
Analogously to Theorem 1 we have that i o R-tree unfoldings are truth preserving and that memory does not matter in these unfolded models.
Theorem 2
For every iCGS M, state q in M, and ATL * -formula ϕ we have:
The proof is given in the Appendix.
Imperfect information: subjective ability
The case for the subjective semantics (i s ) cannot be proven in the same way by using i o Rtree unfoldings. Obviously, when constructing an unfolding of (M, q) for the i s R-semantics one has to take into account paths starting from states indistinguishable from q. A first naive approach could be to define the i s R-unfolding as a structure consisting of i o R-tree unfoldings, one for each epistemic alternative, and to connect the root nodes of all these unfoldings. Unfortunately, this simple idea is not sufficient as illustrated in Example 7.
Example 7 (First naive approach to i s R-tree unfoldings)
We consider the iCGS M 1 shown in Fig. 5 . The story is as follows. A man wants to shoot down a yellow rubber duck in a shooting gallery. The man knows that the duck is in one of the two cells in front of him, but he does not know in which one. He can shoot to the left (action shoot L ) or to the right (shoot R ). Alternatively, he can reach out and open one of the cells for a moment (action look), thus removing his uncertainty. q 1 ) , and interconnect their nodes by epistemic links whenever the corresponding histories are indistinguishable in the original model. The resulting model is shown in Fig. 6 (we will call the model T 1 ). Unfortunately, this construction is not truth-preserving. That is because if a state-subformula is evaluated in states 040 and 151 of T 1 the agent will know where the game is-which is not consistent with the i s semantics: only the last state of each history should be considered.
Let us take the i o R-tree unfoldings
To be more precise, let us consider formula ϕ = a g a g a g shot. Clearly, we
On the other hand, we have
In order to improve the naive approach one may simply add an epistemic link between states 040 and 151. Unfortunately, this does not work either. Such a link indicates that the states 040 and 151 are indistinguishable for a; on the other hand, player a can distinguish the histories which lead to these states. This contradicts the conceptual idea in which states are associated with histories. Moreover, it is easy to construct a concrete counterexample.
To make the observation in Example 7 more formal, suppose hq is some node in the i o Rtree unfolding T o (M, q 0 ) and that in this node a formula a γ is evaluated. Then, a γ holds iff agent a has a successful iR-strategy not only for all paths starting from hq, but also for paths starting from nodes h q such that q ∼ M a q . In the i o R-tree unfolding, however, these nodes are usually not linked via an epistemic transition. On the other hand, we cannot simply introduce the link hq ∼ T o (M,q 0 ) a h q as we would loose soundness of the construction (in general, h and h do not need to be indistinguishable). This observation makes it necessary to introduce a more sophisticated construction for the subjective epistemic tree-like unfoldings under perfect recall, or i s R-pando unfoldings in short. 9 Firstly, we discuss when an iCGS should be considered i s R-pando-like. The idea of a set of connected i o R-tree-like models (like in Example 7) seems to come close. However, we should also account for the "forgetting" of the history of the play when a nested strategic operator is evaluated. This is because if a state subformula (like a γ ) is evaluated in a history h, only the last state of h is relevant. The rest of h is "lost" as it does not influence the truth of a γ in h. We deal with it by adding appropriate "hanging" trees with roots q that are indistinguishable from last (h) in the original models. The new trees are connected to histories in the "basic" tree by appropriate epistemic links. We must also make sure that there are no epistemic links between such trees apart from the ones just explained.
Definition 16 (i
is i s R-pando-like iff it consists of submodels
a } a∈Agt for i ∈ I and some index set I ⊆ N, where:
∪∼ a where each∼ a ⊆ i∈I St i × i∈I St i , and the following conditions are satisfied:
1. the relation ∼ a is transitive for every a ∈ Agt.
2.∼ a is a symmetric relation for every a ∈ Agt.
for all i ∈ I we have∼ a ∩ (St i × St i ) = ∅ (the relation does only exist between different
i o R-tree like models). 4. for q 1 ∈ St i and q 2 ∈ St j with i, j ∈ I , i = j, we have that if q 1∼a q 2 then 
where for two histories h and h we have h≈
(nodes in the same tree indistinguishable for a group must be on the same level). The idea behind this condition is illustrated in Fig. 7 .
Remark 1 We would like to note that it is possible, due to condition 4 of Definition 16, to weaken condition 5 of Definition 16 to the following:
Before we give an intuitive example we show that the concept of i s R-pando-like iCGS is well-defined.
Proposition 6 Let M be an i s R-pando like iCGS as defined in Definition 16. Each relation ∼ a is an equivalence relation for a ∈ Agt.
Proof By definition, each ∼ a is transitive. Symmetry follows from the symmetry of∼ a and of ∼ In the spirit of Propositions 2 and 4 we have that memory is not needed in i s R-pandolike models. The proof for the left-to-right direction is obvious. The sophisticated step is to construct an i s r-strategy from an i s R-strategy. For the sake of readability we have moved the technical part in the appendix (Lemma 3).
Proposition 7 (Recall invariance for i s R-pando-like models) For every i s R-pando-like iCGS M, state q in M, and ATL * -formula ϕ, we have that
Proof Firstly, we recall that all the "subpandos" which form an i o R-tree-like iCGS are not interconnected by transitions and thus the path to each state is unique. The proof is done analogously to Proposition 4; we only consider the important base case where ϕ ≡ A γ and γ contains no strategic modalities. The left-to-right direction is obvious.
For the right-to-left direction suppose that M, q | isR A γ and let s A be a collective iR-strategy for A such that for all λ ∈ out i s (q, s A ) it holds that M, λ | isR γ . Let q ∈ St j be a state reachable fromq ∈ St j withq ∼ M a q for some a ∈ A. Then, we define the memoryless strategy t a as follows: t a (q ) = s a (ρ M j (q, q )). We proceed like this for all states q ,q and define the strategies t a arbitrarily but in a uniform way for all other states in M. (Note, that these are all states which are not reachable from any epistemic alternative of q for some agent in A.) Firstly, we observe that each t a is well-defined as each M j is i o R-tree-like and thus the path ρ M j (q, q ) to a state q is unique.
In order to show that each t a is uniform and that out i s (q, t A ) = out i s (q, s A ) we have to prove that for any two states q 1 reachable fromq 1 , and q 2 reachable fromq 2 with
This part is shown in Lemma 3 in the Appendix.
The basic idea of the subjective epistemic pando unfolding under perfect recall (i s Rpando unfolding in short) is to create copies of the tree starting in q , one for each epistemic alternative. Then, we can link hq with these new root nodes q of the "copies" of the trees Fig. 8 and take e.g. h = 04, q = 0, and q = 040â1; the new node is named 040â1 to ensure that the name is unique as explained below). It is easy to see that these "new" subtrees can only be reached if a formula a γ is evaluated in hq (or some other state h q with hq ∼ T s (M,q 0 ) a h q by transitivity). As mentioned above all nodes in these new subtrees must have unique names. This is the reason why we have to prefix each node h in the new tree by hqâ where hq is the history in the "current tree" andâ encodes that we have used a's indistinguishability relation to reach the "new" tree.
Before we formally define the i s R-pando unfolding, we introduce some additional notation. In the following, we consider words over D := (St ∪ St • {â | a ∈ Agt} • St) + . Thus, D consists of finite sequences of states, possibly interleaved by references to some agents. We use elements from D to give names to nodes of the pando unfolding. Essentially, the name of a node shows how the node is reached from a root by following temporal paths and "jumping" between different trees by use of epistemic links (cf. Fig. 8 ).
We also define auxiliary functions rel :
h , for h = h âh and h ∈ St + and a ∈ Agt;
The intuition for these functions is as follows. Given an element h ∈ D, rel(h) returns the "relevant" part of h, i.e., the subhistory at the end of h of maximal length that does not contain anyâ symbol for any a ∈ Agt. On the other hand, re f (h) returns the "reference" node in the higher-level tree which was used to obtain h. Finally, jump(h) returns the agent whose epistemic link was used to "jump" between the two trees. For example, rel(q 1â q 2 q 3b q 4 ) = q 4 ,
be an iCGS and q ∈ St. We recursively define sets i M ⊆ D which contain the nodes of the i s R-pando unfolding:
We write i
M for i M (q) if state q is clear from context. Note that each h ∈ i M contains exactly i symbols of typeâ j for a j ∈ Agt and j = 1, . . . , i. Intuitively,â denotes that we took a ∼ a -relation step between different trees. Note also that, for instance, q 0 q 1â q 2 ∈ 1 (q 0 ) but q 0â q 2 ∈ 1 (q 0 ). This is because if a link to a new tree model is taken histories have to be "forgotten" and in cases in which the history consists of a single state (e.g. q 0 in q 0â q 2 ) such a link is not necessary and also not desired due to technical reasons. Now, we are ready to define the i s R-pando unfolding. d (a, h), o (h, α) , and π (h) are given as in Definition 12 and 15 where function "last" is replaced with "lastr" and (note that ∼ T s a refers to relation ∼ a ): 
Definition 17 (i s R-pando unfolding) Let
M = (Agt, St, , π, {∼ a } a∈Agt , Act, d, o) be an iCGS and q ∈ St. The i s R-pando unfolding of (M, q), denoted T s (M, q), is defined as T s := T s (M, q) = (Agt, St , , π , {∼ a } a∈Agt , Act, d , o ) where1. St := ∞ i=0 i M (q); 2. for all a ∈ Agt, ∼ T s a ⊆ St M × St M is the smallest reflexive relation such that h ∼ T s a h if: (a) rel(h) ≈ M a rel(h ), for h, h ∈ 0 M (q), or (b) rel(h) ≈ M a
rel(h ) and i. ref (h) ∼ T s a ref (h ) and jump(h) = a = jump(h ), and h, h ∈
i M (q), i > 0, or ii. jump(h) = b = jump(h ) with a = b, and h, h ∈ i M (q), i > 0, or(c) h ∈ i M , h ∈ i+1 M , jump(h ) = a, ref (h ) ∼ T s a h, lastr(ref (h )) ∼ M a
rel(h ) or vice versa with the roles of h and h switched. We note that this means that
h =ĥâq, lastr(ĥ) ∼ M a q, andĥ ∼ T s a h for some q ∈ St M andĥ ∈ i M (q).
Remark 2 (i s R-pando unfolding)
We motivate points 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c) in Definition 17. Items 2(a) and (b) define indistinguishability between nodes of trees from the same set i . In this case, the "jump" must be obtained by the same epistemic relation and the final parts of the corresponding histories in the current trees (the "relevant" parts) must be indistinguishable; moreover, the "reference" nodes (in the trees one level up) must be indistinguishable for the "jump" agent (point 2(b)i) in case we are concerned with epistemic alternatives of this very agent. This is needed to obtain transitivity of the epistemic relation in the resulting forest. Note that, in particular, the length of the relevant subhistories must be the same. Item 2(c) defines the only way how nodes h and h from different sets i and j , i = j, can be linked via an epistemic link. Firstly, it must be the case that j = i + 1. Secondly, the relevant part of h ∈ i+1 must be a single state which is indistinguishable from the last state of the reference part of h ∈ i ; moreover, the reference part of h must also be linked to h. Note, that the relevant parts of h and h do not have to have the same length. This models the "forgetting" if a new state-subformula is evaluated in h.
Example 9 (i s R-pando unfolding)
The i s R-pando unfolding of model (M 1 , q 0 ) from Fig. 5 is shown in Fig. 8 .
Similarly to Sect. 4.2 we can show that an i s R-pando unfolding is i s R-pando-like as expected. For example, it has to be shown that all nodes are disjunct, in order to obtain a tree-like structure, and that the epistemic relation ∼ in the Appendix. The structure of the proof of this proposition and also of our main result, Theorem 3, is outlined in Fig. 9 .
Proposition 8 The i s R-pando unfolding of a pointed iCGS is i s R-pando-like.
Then, thanks to Proposition 7, we obtain that i s R-pando unfoldings are truth-invariant under recall. Now we can state our main result for i s R-pando unfoldings.
Theorem 3
For every iCGS M, state q in M, and ATL * -formula ϕ, it holds that
Again, the proof is moved to the Appendix.
Comparing validities for variants of ATL
In this section we present a formal comparison of the semantic variants defined in Sects. 2 and 3. As stated in the introduction, we compare the variants on the level of their validity sets (or, equivalently, satisfiable sentences). In most cases, they turn out to be different. Also, we can usually show that one variant is a refinement of the other in the sense that its set of validities strictly subsumes the validities induced by the other variant.
In what follows, we write Val(ATL sem ) to denote the set of ATL validities, or the theory of ATL, under semantics sem. Likewise, we write Sat (ATL sem ) for the set of ATL formulae satisfiable in the semantics sem. Note that validity and satisfiability of formulae in all cases considered in this paper is defined over the same class of models, namely the class of imperfect information concurrent game structures. The conceptual reading of Val(ATL sem 1 ) Val(ATL sem 2 ) can be as follows: for "game boards" given by iCGS's, we have that the "game rules" in the ATL sem 1 variant strictly refine the rules in ATL sem 2 . Note also that Val(ATL sem 1 
Sat (ATL sem 1 ). Thus, an alternative reading is "ATL sem 1 admits reasoning about a larger variety of games than ATL sem 2 ".
We will always prove inclusion results for the broadest possible language (usually ATL * ) and non-inclusion results for the narrowest one (usually ATL). Figure 10 gives an overview of the results of Sects. 5.3-5.6. We show that almost all the semantic variants discussed here are different on the level of validities, and that they show a strong pattern: perfect information is a special case of imperfect information, perfect recall games are special case of memoryless games, and properties of objective and subjective abilities of agents are incomparable. Moreover, the type of information has more impact on the validities than the type of recall in the more restricted language of ATL. Interestingly, for the richer languages of ATL + and ATL * this is not the case anymore.
Summary of the results
Note that if we reverse the subsumption signs in Fig. 10 then the graphs describe the hierarchy of satisfiable sentences in different semantics of ATL/ATL * .
Remark 3
It is important to observe that comparing validities is not the same as comparing abilities. For example, subjective ability to enforce γ always implies objective ability to enforce γ . Yet, as we show in Sect. 5.6, the set of validities for objective ability does not subsume the one for subjective ability. It is tempting to think that it should, because for every validity A γ in the subjective semantics, A γ must be also valid in the objective The reason for that is simple. Almost no formulae of type A γ or ¬ A γ are validities of ATL in any semantics that we study. There are only two exceptions: A and ¬ A ⊥. Or, to be more precise, all formulae A γ where γ is tautologically true (i.e., holds on all paths that can occur in any CGS) and ¬ A γ where γ is tautologically false (i.e., fails on all paths in all CGS's). For a nontrivial ability (that is, one which refers to a temporal property that can, but does not have to be true), a valid formula can only connect it to another kind of ability. For example, A ♦p → A ∪ B ♦p is valid in all the semantics considered in this paper.
Perfect recall versus memoryless play under perfect information (IR vs. Ir)
We first proceed to examine the impact of recall on the general strategic properties of agent systems under prefect information. The inclusion results follow naturally from the invariance theorems for tree-like unfoldings presented in Sect. 4. Non-inclusion will be demonstrated by appropriate formulae (that are valid in one semantics and not valid in another). We have already mentioned that, in ATL, the Ir-and IR-semantics coincide (Proposition 1). As a consequence, they induce the same validities: Val(ATL Ir ) = Val(ATL IR ). Thus, regardless of the type of their recall, perfect information agents possess the same abilities with respect to winning conditions that can be specified in ATL. An interesting question is: Does it carry over to more general classes of winning conditions, or are there (broader) languages that can discern between the two types of ability? The answer is: no, it doesn't, and yes, there are. The Ir-and IR-semantics induce different validity sets for ATL * , and in fact the distinction is already present in ATL + . Moreover, it turns out that perfect recall can be seen as a special case of memoryless play in the sense of their general properties.
Proposition 9 Val(ATL
Proof Let an ATL * -formula ϕ be Ir-valid in iCGS's, then it is also Ir-valid in tree-like CGS's, and by Proposition 2 also IR-valid in tree-like CGS's. Thus, by Theorem 1, it is IRvalid in arbitrary CGS's. Since indistinguishability relations do not influence the semantic relation | IR , we get that ϕ is IR-valid in iCGS's.
In particular, the subsumption holds for formulae of ATL + . Moreover: Proof Consider formula
The formula is valid in ATL + IR [33] . On the other hand, its right-to-left part is not valid in ATL + Ir . To see this, we take the single-agent CGS M 5 from Fig. 11 where agent a (the robot) can do the cleaning or deliver a package. Then, for p 1 ≡ clean, p 2 ≡ delivered, we have ) because the formula given in the proof of the very proposition is in particular also an ATL * -formula.
Theorem 4 Val(ATL Ir ) = Val(ATL IR
)
Perfect recall versus memoryless play under imperfect information (iR vs. ir)
Now we compare the memoryless and perfect recall semantics under uncertainty. We treat the case of objective and subjective ability separately.
Imperfect information: objective ability
But on i o R-tree unfoldings, iR-and ir-strategies coincide (Theorem 2), so we get that T o (M, q), q | ior ϕ, and as a consequence ϕ ∈ Sat (ATL * i o r ).
The converse does not hold: Proof To show this, we take the ATL embedding of the CTL duality between combinators E and A♦ (see Sect. 2.5). In fact, only one direction of the equivalence is important here:
(note that the other direction is valid for all the semantics considered in this paper, and actually for all the reasonable semantics of strategic ability that one can come up with).
First, we observe that: (i) ¬ ∅ ♦¬p expresses (regardless of the actual type of ability being considered) that there is a path in the system on which p always holds; (ii) in the "objective" semantics the set out (q, s Agt ) always consists of exactly one path; (iii) for every path λ starting from q, there is an i o R-strategy s Agt such that out (q, s Agt ) = {λ}. From these, it is easy to see that 4 is valid in ATL i o R .
Second, we consider model M 6 in Fig. 12 . 10 Let us take p ≡ ¬angry ∧ ¬suspicious. Then, we have M 6 , q 0 | ior ¬ ∅ ♦¬p but also M 6 , q 0 | ior Agt p, which demonstrates that 4 is not valid in ATL i o r .
Theorem 5 Val(ATL i o r ) Val(ATL i o R )
, and similarly for ATL + and ATL * .
Imperfect information: subjective ability

Proposition 13 Val(ATL
Proof Analogous to Proposition 11.
Proposition 14 Val(ATL i s R ) ⊆ Val(ATL i s r ).
Proof We take the formula 5 which is a consequence of the fixpoint equivalence for a ♦p:
The formula states that if a has an opening move and a follow-up strategy to achieve p eventually, then these can be integrated into a single strategy achieving p already from the initial state. It is easy to see that 5 is valid in ATL i s R , and that the single strategy is just a concatenation of the two strategies that we get on the left hand side of the implication. On the other hand, for the "poor duck model" M 1 and p ≡ shot, we get that 
Perfect versus imperfect information under memoryless play (Ir vs. ir)
We continue by comparing perfect and imperfect information scenarios. That is, in the first class (I), agents recognize the current global state of the system by definition. In the latter (i s /i o ), uncertainty of agents about states constrains their choices. Firstly, we observe that perfect information can be seen as a special case of imperfect information.
Proposition 15 Val(ATL
Proof Since perfect information of agents can be explicitly represented in iCGS by fixing all relations ∼ a as the minimal reflexive relations (q ∼ a q iff q = q ), we have that
Proposition 16 Val(ATL Ir ) ⊆ Val(ATL i s r ).
Proof We show this by presenting a validity for ATL Ir which is not valid in ATL i s r . Consider the formula that captures the right-to-left direction in the fixpoint characterization of A ♦ϕ for single-agent teams and atomic propositions:
To see its invalidity in the i s r-semantics, consider model M 1 from Fig. 5 . We recall that the story behind the model is as follows. A man wants to shoot down a yellow rubber duck in a shooting gallery. The man knows that the duck is in one of the two cells in front of him, but he does not know in which one. Moreover, this has been a long party, and he is very tired, so he is only capable of using memoryless strategies at the moment. Does he have a memoryless strategy which he knows will achieve the goal? No. He can either decide to shoot to the left, or to the right, or reach out to the cells and look what is in (note also that the cells close in the moment after being opened). In each of these cases the man risks that he will fail (at least from his subjective point of view). Can he identify an opening strategy that will guarantee his knowing how to shoot the duck in the next moment? Yes. The opening strategy is to look; if the system proceeds to q 4 then the second strategy is to shoot to the left, otherwise the second strategy is to shoot to the right.
Indeed, for p ≡ shot, we get
which formally concludes our proof.
Proposition 17 Val(ATL Ir ) ⊆ Val(ATL i o r ).
Proof It is sufficient to show that 1 ≡ (p ∨ a g a ♦p) → a ♦p is invalid in the i o r-semantics. Take model M 2 in Fig. 13 and p ≡ shot. Now we have that M 2 , q 0 | ior p ∨ a g a ♦p because a has a uniform strategy that objectively achieves ♦p in q 0 (s a (q) = shoot L for every q) and another uniform strategy in q 1 (s a (q) = shoot R for every q). However, s a and s a cannot be merged into a single uniform strategy, and indeed M 2 , q 0 | ior a ♦p, which concludes the proof. Note that, for ATL i o r , formula 1 is valid in single-agent models, so we really needed to add another agent to the picture.
The following theorems are straightforward consequences. 
By the same reasoning as above, Val(ATL i s R ) ⊆ Val(ATL IR ).
To settle the other direction, we need to use another counterexample, though.
Proposition 18 Val(ATL IR ) ⊆ Val(ATL i s R ).
Proof This time we consider the other direction of the fixpoint characterization for a ♦p: 
2 is IR-valid, but it is not valid in i s R. Consider a modification of the "poor duck model" in Fig. 14 (the party goes on, and the man is not even able to reach out and look anymore; the cells are open initially but they will close in a moment). Take p ≡ shot. We have that
, which concludes the proof.
Theorem 10 Val(ATL i s R ) Val(ATL IR
Mixed setting: information versus memory (Ir vs. iR)
In this section we compare abilities if both dimensions change. For ATL we already know the complete picture because ATL Ir and ATL IR are the same logics, cf. To facilitate proofs, we define an additional temporal operator N ("now") as Nϕ ≡ ϕ U ϕ. Note that M, λ | Nϕ iff M, λ | ϕ in the semantics of CTL * and any ATL-semantics that we have discussed in this paper. Moreover, we note that the formula A Nϕ expresses E A ϕ (everybody in A knows that ϕ) if A is interpreted according to the subjective semantics for imperfect information (i.e., according to | isR and | isr ). 
Theorem 11
which is a validity of ATL 
Apart from minor modifications, the next theorem, considering objective ability, is proven along the same lines. 
Theorem 12 The sets Val(ATL
which is a validity of ATL * i o R but not of ATL * Ir . The latter is shown by the same counterexample as used in the proof of Proposition 10 (we have M 5 , q 0 | Ir ϕ). Finally, it remains to show that ϕ ∈ Val(ATL * i o R ). This part is proven following the same idea as in the proof of Theorem 11. We observe that every strategy s Agt of the grand coalition generates a unique path wrt. objective ability (because, in the objective semantics, possible paths starting from epistemic alternatives are not considered). This also means that uniformity of a strategy does not matter: there is no need to ever consider epistemic alternatives along a path. Hence, the two strategies witnessing Agt ♦(p 1 ∧ Agt ♦p 2 ) can be combined to a single strategy witnessing Agt (♦p 1 ∧ ♦p 2 ).
Between subjective and objective ability for imperfect information (i s vs. i o )
Finally, we compare validity sets for the semantic variants of ATL that differ on the outcome paths which are taken into account, i.e., whether only the paths representing the "objectively" possible courses of action are considered, or all the executions that are "subjectively" possible from the agents' perspective. In the next result we make use of the operator N introduced in Sect. 5.5. For the invalidity, consider the modified poor duck model M 2 from Fig. 13 augmented with additional agent c that has no choice (i.e., at each state, it has only a single irrelevant action wait available). Let us denote the new iCGS by M 3 , and let p ≡ shot. It is easy to see that M 2 , q 0 | ioR c g a g p, and hence also M 2 , q 0 | ioR a N c g a g p. On the other hand, M 2 , q 0 | ioR a, c ♦p, which concludes the proof.
Proposition 19 Formula
2 ≡ a ♦p → p ∨ a g a ♦p is
Proposition 20 Formula
The following is an immediate consequence. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we compare validity sets for different semantic variants of alternating-time temporal logic. In other words, we compare the general properties of games induced by different notions of ability. It is clear that changing the notions of strategy and success in a game leads to a different game. The issue considered here is whether, given a class of games, such a change leads to a different class of games, too. And, if so, what is the precise relationship between the two classes.
A summary of the results is presented in Fig. 10 . The first and most important conclusion is that almost all the semantic variants discussed here are indeed different on the level of general properties they induce; before our study, it was by no means obvious. Moreover, our results show a very strong pattern: perfect information is a special case of imperfect information, perfect recall games are special case of memoryless games, and properties of objective and subjective abilities of agents are incomparable.
The relationships seem very natural, but they were surprisingly nontrivial to prove. This is best witnessed by Sect. 4 which comprises a third part of the paper only to construct appropriate tree-like unfoldings, and prove their equivalence to the original models. While embedding of perfect information in imperfect information is straightforward, the same cannot be said about embedding perfect recall in memoryless semantics-except when we disallow nested modalities. Consider e.g. the truth of formula a a, b ♦p in a pointed iCGS (M, q). Let s a be a's strategy that enforces a, b ♦p to be always the case (suppose that such a strategy exists). After a history h, agent a has different information when executing s a (because the agent has collected observations along h from the root until now) than when we evaluate a, b ♦p in the last state of h (here, the collecting of observations starts anew). In consequence, the "straightforward" unfolding of (M, q) endows agents with too much information when nested strategic formulas are evaluated, and the correctness of the construction is not automatic. For objective abilities, we prove that the standard unfolding still works because path formulae of ATL * (that can be seen as "winning conditions" in the corresponding game) do not discern between the two epistemic positions. For subjective abilities, the unfolding does not work, but it can be recovered by a technical construction with "hanging" subtrees added to the basic tree. This construction is among the main contributions of this paper.
Technical subtleties aside, the most interesting contribution lies possibly in our noninclusion results. First, they show that the language of ATL is sufficiently expressive to distinguish between the main notions of ability. Moreover, non-inclusion is demonstrated on formulae encoding intuitive and well known properties, like fixpoint characterizations of strategic/temporal modalities and the duality between necessary and obtainable outcomes. It is important to see in which semantics the formulae hold, and in which they do not hold. Finally, although the proofs of non-inclusion are very comprehensive (since they are based on counterexamples), finding the counterexamples required expertise and was not straightforward either.
Another interesting outcome of the study is that the type of information has strictly more impact on validities than the type of recall in the language of ATL but not in ATL * . In particular the validity sets of ATL * Ir and ATL * iR are incomparable. This suggests that ATL * allows to specify significantly subtler properties of strategic play than the more restricted language of ATL. 
Lemma 1 Let
Theorem 2 For every iCGS M, state q in M, and ATL * -formula ϕ we have:
Then, the claim follows by Propositions 4 and 5 and for h = q. The proof is done by induction on the structure of ϕ. Base cases:
Propositional case: Straightforward. Case: ϕ ≡ A γ where γ contains no nested strategic modalities.
We construct the memoryless strategy
Aĥ . For all other histories h (which do not have the formĥh ) we define s a (h ) arbitrarily but in a uniform way. It is easy to see that s A is uniform: For two histories h 1 =ĥ h and h 2 =ĥ h withĥ ∼
(by Lemma 1) and thus s A (last (h)h ) = s A (last (h)h ). By construction of s A we have that
Since the valuation of propositions does only depend on the final state of a history and by ( ) we have
We construct a witnessing i o R-strategy s A in M as follows:
We define s a arbitrarily for all other histories with the condition to assign the same actions to indistinguishable histories in M. The definition of s a does only take into account the subtree starting at h. Then, by Lemma 2 we have that strategy s A is uniform by construction. Note, that it may differ from s A but only for histories which are not realizable given that the initial state is last(h). By construction of s A , we also have
Since the valuation of propositions does only depend on the final state of a history and Induction step:
For any maximal strict subformula ϕ of ϕ we label all states h in T o (M, q) and states last (h) in M with a new proposition p ϕ iff ϕ holds in this very state. Then, we replace each ϕ in ϕ with proposition p ϕ . This yields a formula without nested modalities and the claim follows by induction.
Proofs of Sect. 4.3
In this section we give all details needed to prove Theorem 3. The structure of the proof is shown in Fig. 9 .
The following lemma is essential to show that truth in i s R-pando-like models is insensitive to the type of available strategies (memoryless vs. perfect recall). The lemma is needed to show that a uniform perfect recall strategy in the pando-like model gives rise to a uniform memoryless strategy. Therefore, we have to show that two states which are indistinguishable in the model give rise to indistinguishable histories. 
Lemma 3 Let
Proof The setting is illustrated in Fig. 15 . In the following we consider all possibilities how q,q 1 ,q 2 , q 1 , and q 2 can be located. We recall that ρ M k (q ) = q means that q is the root node of model M k . We assume that k, l, m ∈ I where I is the index set from Definition 16.
That is, q 1 is the root node of M k . We haveq 1 = q 1 ∼ M b q. Then, by Definition 16.5 |ρ(q 2 )| = |ρ(q 2 )| which impliesq 2 = q 2 . Hence, we have We consider case (ii). Firstly, suppose that h l ∈ i+1 and h l = h â l q . We consider
it also has the required form. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that h l+1 ∈ i+2 . Then, h l+1 = h â l+1 q for some h ∈ i+1 with h ∼ a l+1 h l . In this case, h does also have the form h = h â l q and therewith h l+1 = h â l q â l+1 q contradicting h l+1 ∈ i+2 by definition of the sets j .
Secondly, if h l ∈ i we have that h l+1 ∈ i−1 i ∪ i+1 and that h l+1 has the required form if h l+1 ∈ i+1 following the very same reasoning as in case (i). Moreover, it cannot be the case that h l+1 ∈ i−1 . To see this, we observe that there is some h u with 1
A ) * h u . Now the reasoning of the previous case can be applied to obtain a contradiction.
The next lemma states that the relevant parts (i.e. histories) of two states of the pando unfolding are group indistinguishable in the model if the states are group indistinguishable in the pando unfolding and are located within the same tree (i.e. share the same root node). The following two lemmata are needed to prove Theorem 3. The first lemma states that the set of epistemic alternatives to any state is the same in the model and in the pando unfolding. The next lemma is needed to show that the witnessing strategy which we shall construct in the invariance Theorem 3 is uniform. We note that we have to exclude the first state in h F because it is already contained in h. For all other histories h (which do not have the prescribed form) we define s a (h ) arbitrarily but in a uniform way. The setting is illustrated in Fig. 16 . 
Lemma 6 Let h 1 (∼
Lemma 10 Let
